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 Germany’s war at sea from 1939 to 1945 commonly is characterized as a submarine (U-boat) war with minor appearances by famous but ineffectual 
battleships. Indeed, Winston Churchill famously wrote that the only thing that 
“ever really frightened” him during the war was the U-boat menace, and scholar-
ship on the Second World War at sea largely has reinforced the perception that 
the only meaningful threat the German navy posed during the war came from its 
submarines. While much has been written on the famous engagements between 
Germany’s major capital ships—in particular Admiral Graf Spee, Bismarck, and 
Scharnhorst—and their British pursuers, these episodes tend to be treated as 
singular or as exceptional to the general conduct of the war at sea.1 These surface 
battles are rarely placed in a strategic context. Admiral Erich Raeder, head of the 
German navy at the time, wrote at the outbreak of war with Britain and France that 
the German surface fleet could “do no more than show that they know how to die 
gallantly and thus are willing to create the foundations for later reconstruction.”2 
He stated later, in his memoirs, that “[s]ooner or later our [surface] raiders would 
inevitably wear out, and their importance in the war picture wane. But I hoped that 
by that time our submarines would be strong enough to take their place against 
the enemy with even greater effect.”3 Taken out of broader strategic context, both 
statements give the impression that Germany’s surface fleet was inevitably doomed 
against the Allied navies and merely bought time for the U-boat’s ascendancy.
While Germany’s naval war from 1942 on was waged primarily by U-boats, its 
surface fleet played a far more significant strategic 
role in the first half of the war than is appreciated 
popularly. Furthermore, the construction of Ger-
many’s surface fleet was not the result of myopic 
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or traditionalist naval officers desiring to revive the mighty Hochseeflotte (High 
Seas Fleet) of the First World War, as often is assumed. Rather, it was the result of 
considered appraisals of the German navy’s performance in the First World War 
and the development of naval technology during the interwar period.
And despite his initial pessimism and postwar recollections, Admiral Raeder 
had not given up on the surface fleet’s prospects against enemy shipping and na-
val concentration when war broke out in 1939. Until 1942, the German surface 
fleet managed to disperse British forces effectively and wage economic warfare 
against British shipping in conjunction with the U-boat campaign. Plans also 
were made—though never fully realized—to challenge British naval power di-
rectly by the deployment of the surface fleet, inflict a decisive blow against British 
shipping, and win the war at sea. It was only in 1941 and 1942, with the destruc-
tion of Bismarck and the relocation of German surface forces away from the At-
lantic, that the war at sea between Britain and Germany shifted predominantly 
to a “U-boat war.”
LEARNING THE LESSONS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1918–30
It long has been believed that between the world wars German naval officers 
remained fixated on large surface ships and a somewhat caricatured version of 
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s sea-power theories, convinced that a decisive engagement 
between large surface fleets was the only way to ensure control of the sea for the 
victor.4 Therefore, it often is argued, the German navy was unprepared for the 
Second World War because it failed to realize the full potential of U-boats.5 More 
recently, some historians have challenged the view that navies the world over 
were really so wedded to the presumption of the battleship’s tactical primacy.6 
Building on these recent analyses, an examination of the postwar reflections of 
German naval officers shows that planners had a far more nuanced, considered, 
and realistic appraisal of the First World War’s U-boat campaign, which helps 
explain why Germany devoted such significant resources to constructing surface 
warships before the outbreak of the Second World War.
The recovery of the German navy after the First World War was a long and ardu-
ous process. The Treaty of Versailles permitted the Weimar Republic to maintain a 
Reichsmarine that was largely a coastal force, and it forbade U-boats until modified 
by the 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement. Although the German navy main-
tained a focus on continental defense throughout most of the interwar period, this 
did not mean that officers failed to reflect on the First World War at sea. Indeed, 
operational analyses were undertaken throughout the 1920s, often in the guise of 
historical studies, with the intention of reviewing the use of naval power in another 
global conflict.7 These studies provide key insights into the professional mind-set 
that would inform the development of the German surface fleet later, in the 1930s.
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While historians have regarded the unrestricted U-boat warfare campaign of 
the First World War as heralding the ascendancy of U-boats (and later airpower) 
over battleships, to many German contemporaries this was not the reality. In-
deed, even during the unrestricted U-boat campaign there was a growing real-
ization that the U-boats could not deliver a decisive blow against Britain’s vital 
shipping. In spite of a promising start, the U-boats were not able to stop shipping 
from reaching Britain, and their efforts to do so helped bring the United States 
into the war against Germany.8 Initial efforts during the First World War to hunt 
down and destroy the U-boats were ineffective because to that point there was 
no means of locating and destroying submerged U-boats. The situation changed 
in 1917 with the introduction of the convoy system, in which clustered merchant 
ships were protected by escort vessels equipped with a variety of antisubmarine-
warfare (ASW) devices.9 Notably, interview data from captured German U-
boat crews showed a recognition that U-boats alone could not bring victory to 
Germany.10
In an attempt to aid the U-boats’ efforts, beginning in late 1917 the Imperial 
German Navy deployed its surface fleet to support the U-boats. Admiral Rein-
hard Scheer, who had been the commander in chief of the High Seas Fleet during 
the 1916 Battle of Jutland, recounted in his memoirs that by deploying the fleet to 
attack North Sea convoys, it was hoped that “[a]part from depriving the enemy of 
the supplies he awaited, it would place him under the necessity of affording better 
protection to the neutral shipping placed at his service, for which more warships 
would be required; these, again, would have to be taken from among those oc-
cupied in the war on U-boats.”11
The German fleet did place renewed strain on the Allies and presented the 
Germans with an opportunity to harass both components of British sea power, its 
military strength and resources, which U-boats had been unable to do on their 
own. Sir Henry Newbolt, a historian for Britain’s Committee of Imperial Defence, 
writing during the interwar period, noted that the assignment of battle squad-
rons to protect convoys against enemy surface ships “was a great departure from 
the principle of rigid concentration which had dominated the organization and 
employment of the [British] Grand Fleet since the war began: it was illustrative 
of the extent to which the war against commerce had engaged our strength and 
resources.”12 By the end of the war, the High Seas Fleet had been able to show only 
meager results in support of the unrestricted U-boat-warfare campaign. None-
theless, as noted, even during the war it became clear that U-boats were incapable 
of delivering a decisive blow to Britain on their own. Thus, reflecting on the con-
duct of the war at sea throughout the 1920s, key German officers emphasized that 
the potential represented by cooperation between U-boats and the surface fleet, 
while heretofore unrealized, was nonetheless real.
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Rear Admiral Arno Spindler was charged with the construction and develop-
ment of Germany’s U-boats during the First World War. Later he headed the bu-
reau studying ASW, established in 1925. In an essay written in 1926, he acknowl-
edged that “[a]s long as submarines exist they will continue to be a threat to those 
nations which are unconditionally forced to rely upon overseas transportation.” 
On the other hand, he recognized the effect the British surface warships had, 
especially their blockading of the North Sea, stressing that “the purely military 
employment of the submarines”—that is, the targeting of enemy warships rather 
than merchant ships—“was prematurely brought to a close.”13 If the U-boats had 
been deployed more effectively against warships, he argued, they might have 
proved invaluable in breaking the blockade. In this vein, Captain Albert Gayer, 
a senior officer in the U-boat arm during the war, also noted several attempts 
at conducting operations with the surface fleet against enemy warships (in one 
such foray, in August 1917, the British lost two cruisers to U-boats deployed in 
ambush) and also drew attention to unrealized plans for asymmetrical warfare 
conducted by air, surface, and U-boat units.14
With regard to using U-boats as commerce raiders, Spindler, Gayer, and oth-
ers argued that U-boats needed to be made larger to increase their operational 
range and better armed for engaging convoy escorts, even on the surface.15 Gayer 
assessed the potential of these large vessels, known as U-cruisers, late in the war 
as follows: “The British regarded with great anxiety these new developments in 
submarine warfare, and the greater possibilities which existed as a result of this 
expansion of submarine warfare. That these operations would extend far beyond 
the field of the British counter-measures was better understood in England than 
in Germany; hence their characterization that the Germans had given up their 
weapons ‘five minutes’ too soon.”16 In apparent validation of Gayer’s ideas, former 
German submariners were working on the other side of the world to help the Im-
perial Japanese Navy design a submarine fleet that ended up closely resembling 
the U-cruiser concept.17
Wolfgang Wegener, a flag officer during the interwar period, was arguably one 
of the most influential personalities within the Reichsmarine.18 In his main work, 
The Naval Strategy of the World War, published in 1927, he characterized the 
effectiveness of the unrestricted U-boat campaign and the British blockade of 
Germany as being akin (to use a modern term) to mutually assured destruction: 
“[W]e starved in jail and almost succeeded in making our jailer starve with us.”19 
In other words, while U-boats were able to attack Britain’s vital maritime ship-
ping, the blockade imposed by the Royal Navy effectively left Germany unable to 
access its own vital shipping. He concludes that, “[a]s valuable as the submarine 
campaign may have been, it gained only partial command of the sea. The subma-
rine can destroy sea lanes but cannot protect them. Submarines can dive under a 
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blockade but cannot break it.”20 Overcoming those obstacles still would require a 
powerful surface fleet.
Finally, the development of asdic (a primitive sonar named after the Anti- 
Submarine Detection Investigation Committee) also reinforced during the inter-
war period the view that ASW outmatched the capability of U-boats. By sending 
out pulses that would rebound off a submerged U-boat’s hull, asdic could provide 
its approximate location. The device was developed but not used operationally 
during the First World War. Historical examination suggests that while the Royal 
Navy placed undue faith in and reliance on asdic during the interwar period, it 
did so to dissuade potential rivals from developing U-boats.21 Karl Dönitz, Rae-
der’s successor and the head of the U-boat arm during the Second World War, 
later boasted in his memoirs, “I did not consider that the efficient working of 
ASDIC had been proved, and in any case I had no intention of allowing myself 
to be intimidated by British disclosures.”22 Yet, according to Peter Padfield, “un-
certainty about the range and effectiveness of ASDIC influenced U-boat Com-
manders right up to the outbreak of war,” and Dönitz as well.23 Thus, right up to 
the very eve of the Second World War, even the head of the U-boat arm did not 
believe that U-boats offered a viable alternative to a surface fleet.
Although focusing on U-boat performance during the First World War, these 
studies help to explain the later development of the German surface fleet. The 
use of U-boats as a war-winning weapon in the First World War ultimately was 
considered a failure. The limitations on the U-boat’s armament and operational 
range meant that Germany was unable to challenge the British blockade effective-
ly or operate in distant theaters. The implementation of the convoy system and 
the development of ASW devices, and later asdic, also appeared to undermine 
the wartime potential of U-boats. Given these limitations and the restrictions 
imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, it was a reasonable belief that a surface fleet 
would continue to be the decisive factor in the employment of naval power in any 
future conflict.
This did not mean that U-boats were neglected completely. Rather, it appeared 
that U-boats could not be relied on as a stand-alone decisive weapon and did 
not offer a realistic alternative for the revival of the German navy in the interwar 
period until nearly the outbreak of the Second World War, as will be discussed. 
Instead, several German officers speculated on how U-boats and surface forces 
could be of mutually beneficial use.
For Erich Raeder, the future head of the German navy, the First World War 
also suggested that the surface fleet would continue to be decisive in any future 
global war. Raeder spent part of his interwar career posted to the archives, work-
ing on a dissertation focused on cruiser warfare for the official history of the 
German war at sea. Although he is characterized as a staunch traditionalist of the 
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“Mahan school,” one who sought decisive battle to achieve maritime hegemony, 
his work during this period suggests otherwise.24 Keith Bird, Raeder’s biographer, 
argues that in his analysis of Vice Admiral Maximilian von Spee’s Far East Asian 
Cruiser Squadron, “Raeder noted the disruption and dislocation of troop move-
ments and Allied shipping caused by the threat posed by Spee’s ships, as well as 
the large number of warships diverted to search for his squadron and the lone 
raiders such as the Emden and Karlsruhe.”25 Indeed, rather than dismissing the 
impact of Spee’s squadron as a distraction from a decisive battle with the British 
in the North Sea, Raeder instead noted that “this Squadron affected conditions 
at almost every British Station, and materially altered the strengths in the main 
theater of the war, no fewer than three battlecruisers being withdrawn from the 
North Sea at the same time; this weakening of the Grand Fleet should have had 
a definite influence on the attitude of the German Naval Staff and the Higher 
Command.”26
Raeder’s interest in cruiser warfare and using surface warships to disperse an 
opponent’s naval force possibly dates from 1914, when Vice Admiral Franz Hip-
per, whom Raeder served as chief of staff, proposed to use fast battle cruisers to 
break out into the Atlantic to conduct such operations, hoping to disperse the 
British Grand Fleet that was tasked with bottling up the High Seas Fleet in the 
North Sea.27
Raeder found validation for his evaluation of Spee’s squadron from French 
naval theorist Admiral Raoul Castex. Castex posited that a favorable situation for 
a weaker naval power could be created by strategic maneuver to force a dispersal 
of superior enemy forces, and notably he used Spee’s squadron as an unrealized 
example.28 The influence of Castex on Raeder has received almost no historical 
attention, although it challenges the assumption that Raeder’s understanding of 
sea power was fundamentally, if simplistically, Mahanian.29 Years later, during the 
lead-up to the Second World War, the potential value of undermining superior 
sea power by dispersing one’s own naval forces and attacking the opponent’s ship-
ping was Raeder’s guiding strategic principle.
REARMING: THE EVOLUTION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THE  
GERMAN NAVY, 1930–39
Throughout the 1930s, the German navy underwent a process of rearmament 
that saw the capital ship retain its supremacy as the main arbiter of naval power. 
This was not because of a manic fixation on big ships; rather, it was because 
capital ships offered the most-effective means of exercising naval power, owing 
to improvements in their operational range, armaments, propulsion, and armor. 
In contrast, the performance of U-boats barely had improved since 1918; they 
continued to suffer from poor visibility on the surface, leaving them vulnerable 
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to surprise attack, and near immobility when submerged. As a platform they had 
restricted armament, while speed remained generally constrained. Still, several 
innovations would elevate the importance of the U-boat within the fleet.30
Under the Treaty of Versailles, the six obsolete battleships permitted to the 
Reichsmarine could be replaced in the 1930s, although the new ships were not 
to exceed ten thousand tons. As a result, the new ships sacrificed the heavy ar-
mament and protection of a standard battleship for the high speed of a cruiser, 
leading to a hybrid capital ship termed a Panzerschiff (armored ship), colloquially 
known as a pocket battleship. The first to be laid down, Deutschland, possessed 
a limited main armament of six eleven-inch guns, accompanied by a secondary 
armament of eight six-inch guns and eight torpedo tubes. This comparatively 
paltry armament was compensated for with a maximum speed of twenty-eight 
knots, unmatched by any battleship of the time.31 Another novel feature was its 
diesel engines, which provided an astounding ten-thousand-nautical-mile range 
at twenty knots without needing to refuel—alleviating what had been a major 
handicap of the High Seas Fleet.32 These capabilities led German strategists to 
theorize that the Panzerschiff could prey almost at will on enemy shipping by 
outrunning more-powerful opponents and outgunning weaker ones.33
Germany’s naval rearmament plan seemingly was vindicated in June 1935 
with the signing of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. The potential threat 
that Deutschland posed had spurred Britain to conclude the agreement to cap 
Germany’s naval revival and reduce the pace of rearmament in Europe.34 It per-
mitted Germany a 35 percent parity to the Royal Navy in surface ship tonnage 
and 45 percent in U-boat tonnage—beyond the Versailles restrictions.35 How-
ever, thereafter Adolf Hitler pursued a continentally focused rearmament policy, 
and only another two Panzerschiffe, Admiral Scheer and Admiral Graf Spee, were 
completed.
Secret preparations also had been under way to revive the U-boat arm via 
foreign firms, German dummy companies, and preassembly that circumvented 
the Versailles restrictions, although actual production was not begun until the 
Anglo-German Naval Agreement was signed. From 1935 to 1939 the Kriegsma-
rine (renamed from Reichsmarine in 1935) built fifty-seven U-boats, mainly of 
three distinct classes. The Type IIA was the first of a series (A through D) of 
small coastal boats displacing a mere 254 tons and completed just weeks after the 
1935 agreement.36 These were intended as intermediate designs to provide data 
to inform future U-boat construction and to operate in the North and Baltic Seas 
against potential threats posed by France, Russia, and Poland. A larger vessel, 
the Type I, displaced 862 tons and had a greater range and armament. This type 
proved to be overly cumbersome, so only two (U-25 and U-26) were completed, 
compared with the fifty Type IIs commissioned between 1935 and 1940.37
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The primary purpose of the two follow-on U-boat classes, the Type VII and 
Type IX, was to conduct longer-range operations in the Atlantic. The first of the 
Type VII series (A through F) displaced 626 tons when completed in 1936 and 
had a range of 6,200 nautical miles at ten knots on the surface. The Type IX was 
the largest of the new U-boats, displacing 1,032 tons and accommodating an 
increased armament capacity of six torpedo tubes (four bow, two stern) and a 
10,500-nautical-mile range at ten knots. Its initial role was somewhat ambiguous, 
as the naval high command favored its use in direct cooperation with the sur-
face fleet, while Dönitz and his supporters advocated that it be used as a distant 
commerce raider.38 Production was paused until a decision was reached—one 
that favored Dönitz’s conception—and consequently the first Type IX was not 
commissioned until 1938.39 Despite some setbacks, of 1,158 U-boats constructed 
from 1935 to 1945, approximately nine hundred were Type VIIs and IXs.40
It was the ominous emergence of Deutschland, however, that was of primary 
concern to other European navies. Indeed, an arms race ensued from 1935 to 1939 
that led to the evolution of the fast battleship. The fast battleship type emphasized 
speed on a platform that had been designed to optimize firepower and protection. 
The first to counter Deutschland was the French Dunkerque, launched in 1935, 
which achieved 29.5 knots. The Italians, in turn, responded in 1937 with the thirty- 
knot Vittorio Veneto class. The Germans countered with the Scharnhorst class, 
comprising its namesake and Gneisenau, which had been intended as Panzer-
schiffe until the original keels were scrapped in 1934 and redesigned.41 The new 
hulls, laid down in 1935 and eventually displacing around 34,841 tons, carried a 
heavier nine-gun main battery and better armor protection. The new class was 
intended to counter Dunkerque, although political considerations limited its ar-
mament to eleven-inch guns so as not to antagonize Britain. Experimental high-
pressure steam turbines that promised a maximum speed of around thirty knots 
but at a cost in range and endurance were incorporated instead of diesel engines 
like Deutschland’s, and they proved much more challenging to maintain.42 In 1936, 
Germany laid down its first true fast battleships, the 41,700-ton Bismarck class 
(Bismarck and Tirpitz), equipped with eight fifteen-inch guns, capable of reaching 
twenty-nine knots, and with an 8,500-nautical-mile operational range at nineteen 
knots—representing significant reductions compared with Panzerschiff character-
istics.43 The British Admiralty responded with its own fast battleships, the King 
George V class, in 1939.
In the meantime, Raeder was refining his views on German naval strategy. In 
February 1937, he outlined his ideas for rearmament and his principles of naval 
strategy to Hitler and other senior figures of the Reich. These “reflected a clear 
formulation of his naval strategy and the culmination of his own strategic stud-
ies and experiences and the themes that had dominated the debate over naval 
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strategy since the end of World War I.”44 Seeing the Atlantic Ocean as the pivotal 
theater of naval operations for conducting war on an enemy’s economy, Raeder 
declared that the objective of the German navy must be the defense of German 
shipping lanes and the relentless “interdiction of those of our enemy.”45 A deter-
mined offensive against enemy shipping would undermine the economic ability 
of opponents to wage war, while simultaneously forcing them to defend their own 
sea-lanes rather than target German shipping. Tellingly, Raeder also argued that 
new technology, such as submarines and airpower, had not supplanted capital 
ships as decisive units in naval warfare, but rather had augmented their opera-
tional possibilities at sea.46
In 1938, Hitler declared Britain to be a potential adversary. That same year, a 
strategic study recently produced by the Oberkommando der Marine (German 
naval command) concluded that only by cruiser warfare conducted by surface 
ships (especially the Panzerschiffe), with the cooperation of U-boats, could Ger-
many hope to exercise effective naval power. No consensus, however, could be 
reached on the exact role that capital ships were to play in cruiser warfare waged 
in the Atlantic.47 Although Raeder continued to support a strategy of cruiser war-
fare conducted by the Panzerschiffe, his views came into increasing conflict with 
Hitler’s, who hoped to use the revived German surface fleet as an instrument of 
global power politics against British naval power, more so than its commerce.48 
This tension undermined the establishment of a clear direction for the Kriegsma-
rine up to and during the Second World War.
Nonetheless, plans were put in effect for the construction of a German fleet, 
known as Plan Z. Although it remained unrealized, thus ultimately more of a wish 
list of warships than a coherent plan, it offers insight into the Kriegsmarine’s stra-
tegic priorities just before the outbreak of war. Rather than rely on a single vessel 
type, and perhaps hoping to reach a consensus, Raeder instead pushed for a bal-
anced fleet comprising sixteen capital ships, four aircraft carriers, 249 U-boats, and 
several light vessels, to be complete by 1947. Of the 249 U-boats listed in the plan, 
sixty were coastal U-boats, 162 the Atlantic types, and twenty-seven large types. 
But the nucleus of the Plan Z fleet was a new generation of Panzerschiffe and fast 
battleships (never completed) that would have optimized range and speed.49
Although Plan Z concentrated on the construction of new capital ships, the Ger-
man naval high command did have plans for a robust U-boat arm that included 
large fleet U-boats and U-cruisers that could operate both with the surface fleet 
and independently in distant waters. Only one, the Type XB minelayer, was ever 
completed. The Type XII, which resembled the Type IX in shape and armament 
but displaced some two thousand tons and was capable of making twenty knots, 
finally would have provided the German navy with a submarine capable of oper-
ating directly with its surface ships. Echoing Gayer’s assessment in 1926, Raeder 
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outlined specifications for a U-cruiser in a letter dated March 1937. “Tasks: of-
fensive operations against merchantmen in distant waters. The U-cruiser has to be 
able to take over the role of a surface ship and have the firepower of an auxiliary 
cruiser or escort ship, when protecting or attacking merchantmen.”50 The Type XI 
U-cruiser would have had an enormous displacement of 3,140 tons. Its main arma-
ment, aside from eight torpedo tubes, was to be four five-inch guns in two twin 
turrets and four antiaircraft guns. It also was designed to carry a seaplane for recon-
naissance. Although these designs appear somewhat fantastical, they indicate that 
the German naval command had high hopes and ambitions for its U-boat arm.
By 1939, the construction of the Plan Z fleet was under way. The battle in-
structions for the Kriegsmarine, issued in May 1939, reemphasized the need to 
concentrate operations against enemy shipping rather than against naval forces, 
in the event of war with Britain and France. The aim of naval warfare, it stated, 
was to “cripple England’s and France’s military and economic imports by water.” 
This, the instructions declared, could be successfully undertaken “only on the 
oceans”—that is, beyond the North Sea.51 The instructions went on to state that 
war on enemy shipping “is directed equally against the cargoes and shipping space 
of the enemy. Combat action even against inferior enemy naval forces is not an 
aim in itself and is therefore not to be sought.”52 While the U-boats concentrated 
on enemy shipping around the coast, the Luftwaffe (German air force) was to 
mine and destroy transport facilities in enemy ports by air. As many surface ships 
as possible would operate throughout the Atlantic and farther abroad, supported 
by a network of supply ships, many operating out of neutral ports—a system that 
had its origins in the First World War.53 Finally, to aid the war on enemy ship-
ping, German naval forces were to disrupt the expected British blockade of the 
North Sea through small operations, with the further aim of “keeping as many of 
the enemy forces as possible continuously tied up” in the North Sea.54 Thus, the 
primary purpose of the German surface fleet in the event of war with Britain and 
France was to make a relentless attack on enemy sea-lanes, with the intention of 
destroying and disrupting enemy shipping and dispersing enemy naval forces.
The plan’s strategic concept went beyond cruiser warfare and had origins in 
the First World War, when the High Seas Fleet was deployed to degrade British 
maritime power in both its economic and military dimensions, and was reminis-
cent of Castex’s theory.55 Only in September 1939 did Dönitz advocate a strategic 
alternative, in a memorandum outlining a construction program for three hun-
dred U-boats and various light surface craft.56 Concerned more about the mer-
chant vessels themselves than their cargo, he hoped to wage a tonnage war, with 
the intention of sinking ships faster than new ones could be built to replace them. 
The famous wolf-pack tactic would be used to overwhelm merchant convoys, 
coordinated by radio communication either from shore or from a Type IX U-boat 
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serving as a command-and-control hub for the “pack.” Given the later conduct of 
the war, Dönitz’s alternative appears reasonable. However, his proposal came on 
the eve of the war and in the context of impressive technological improvements 
to surface warships. Until this point, therefore, the U-boats did not offer a feasible 
alternative to Germany’s hybrid cruiser-warfare concept.
Indeed, the evolution of Germany’s naval strategy clearly was linked with the 
technological innovations of the 1930s. The capital ship remained the primary 
instrument of sea power because of the comparative primitiveness of submarines 
and aircraft. Deutschland appeared to be an epochal warship that made feasible a 
nascent conception of cruiser warfare using powerful surface warships operating 
at distant ranges. The lessons of the First World War were refined and adapted 
in response to the emergence and progress of technology and the anticipation of 
enemy fleets and plans. Despite its focus on capital ships, the Plan Z fleet reflected 
an evolution in German naval thought beyond the “decisive battle” strategy that 
had dominated the Imperial German Navy. When war did break out in Septem-
ber 1939, however, the Kriegsmarine possessed an incomplete naval force that 
was smaller than the High Seas Fleet, with most of its units not intended for 
operations against the Royal Navy. Although ultimately unsuccessful, these con-
cepts significantly determined the course of the war from 1939 to 1941.
THE HEYDAY OF THE GERMAN SURFACE FLEET: 1939–41
With Plan Z well out of reach, construction of heavy warships ceased in Septem-
ber 1939, exempting those nearing completion, and a new program dedicated to 
producing the Type VII and Type IX U-boats was implemented. However, the 
number of U-boats available was limited and the strategic prospects of the Ger-
man navy at the outbreak of war in 1939 were negligible. Yet by June 1940, Ger-
many’s geostrategic position had improved owing to the seizure of Norway (an 
achievement greatly aided by the surface fleet) and France. The French coastal 
ports were especially crucial because they allowed direct access to the Atlantic, 
while Norway secured the North Sea, thus undermining the effectiveness of the 
British blockade.57 Raeder’s initial pessimism that his forces could do nothing 
more than show how to “die gallantly” was replaced by an enthusiasm to oper-
ate the surface fleet and U-boat arm together against Britain’s shipping, aided by 
auxiliary cruisers.
U-boats were deployed at focal points for trade around Britain—the most 
likely places they might encounter merchant ships. Their numbers were insuf-
ficient, however, to threaten Britain’s maritime shipping decisively; Germany 
would not have more than a hundred U-boats until April 1941.58 Lack of numbers 
also meant that most attacks were conducted against independent vessels by indi-
vidual U-boats. It was not until September 1940 that Dönitz successfully used the 
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wolf-pack tactic against a convoy, sinking eleven of fifteen merchant ships.59 De-
spite sinking 2,186,158 tons of merchant shipping in 1940, this translated to over-
all convoy losses that year of just 1.63 percent—insufficient to be decisive. Thus, 
to supplement the U-boat campaign, surface ships once again were deployed to 
wage cruiser warfare. The Reichsmarine believed this would force the Royal Navy 
to disperse its forces, would disrupt enemy naval operations, and would prevent a 
concentration against the U-boats.60 Germany’s commerce raiders were ordered 
not to engage equal or superior enemy ships.
The heyday of surface operations lasted from 1940 until 1941, during which 
time the conduct of the surface fleet, in conjunction with the U-boats, caused 
disproportionate havoc to Britain’s shipping and prevented the Royal Navy from 
concentrating its forces fully.61 In October 1940, Admiral Scheer became the first 
German capital ship to break out into the Atlantic since the war began.62 Show-
casing both the qualities of the class and the efficiency of the supply-ship system 
in a voyage that stretched as far as the Indian Ocean, Scheer sank 99,059 tons of 
merchant shipping before returning to Germany in March 1941. An attack on 
Convoy HX84 in the North Atlantic resulted in the sinking of five ships totaling 
38,720 tons, along with the escorting armed merchant cruiser Jervis Bay. Although 
a relatively minor achievement, the attack caused the next two HX convoys to be 
recalled to port and held up further convoys for twelve days. The heavy cruiser 
Admiral Hipper made a follow-on sortie in November. It achieved meager results 
but was the first heavy German warship to put in successfully to the French port 
of Brest, in December 1940, where it posed a more immediate threat to Atlantic 
shipping.63 Meanwhile, disguised auxiliary cruisers were deployed into the Atlan-
tic, the Indian Ocean, and the Pacific. In July, one auxiliary cruiser, Widder, forced 
the British Admiralty to stop independent shipping and divert convoys away from 
the West Indies, while another, Atlantis, would sink a record 145,687 tons before 
meeting its end in November 1941 against HMS Devonshire.64
Although it may appear that the surface fleet was merely being used as a stop-
gap until more U-boats were made available, the operations of the surface fleet 
played a far more significant strategic role in the first half of the war at sea than 
often is acknowledged. These operations not only disrupted Britain’s shipping; 
they also often forced Britain to disperse its naval power across the globe. Three 
Royal Navy task forces, including four cruisers and two aircraft carriers, were dis-
patched to find Scheer. A sighting by HMS Glasgow brought an additional carrier 
and four cruisers into the hunt.65 Through the continuous deployment of power-
ful surface warships, Raeder also hoped to affect the overall strategic situation. 
He calculated that this threat to their merchant shipping would force the British 
to split their forces even further between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean.66 
On 25 December 1940, Hipper intercepted a convoy carrying forty thousand 
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troops to the Middle East, but was driven off after a brief engagement with British 
escorts. This encounter nonetheless had significant consequences; the Admiralty 
rushed to assign heavy warships to convoy escort.67 Although fewer ASW vessels 
were diverted than Germany’s naval high command expected, the commitment 
of British heavy escorts demonstrates the Admiralty’s level of anxiety and vali-
dates the threat Raeder’s surface fleet posed. The surface fleet, therefore, did not 
operate as a mere transitional force in anticipation of a larger U-boat fleet.
Four heavy German warships were active from January until March 1941, a 
period that marked the first successful complex, anticommerce naval operation 
in the Atlantic theater. Operation BERLIN was the largest and the most success-
ful Atlantic operation conducted by the German surface fleet during the war. It 
began in January 1941, when Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, under the command 
of Vice Admiral Günther Lütjens, ventured into the Atlantic and, aided by nine 
supply ships, sank or captured 116,610 tons of shipping over sixty days. Distant 
cooperation among Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and U-boats led to the tracking and 
interception of Convoy SL67 on 7–8 March, which resulted in five ships being 
sunk by the U-boats. Before steering for France, Lütjens intercepted several more 
merchant ships that had been dispersed from a convoy because of an attack by U-
boats.68 On 9–11 February, during Hipper’s second sortie, U-37, FW-600 aircraft, 
and Hipper carried out the first successful asymmetrical attack against Convoy 
HG30.69 The next day, this also led to Hipper’s greatest success: sinking seven of 
nineteen unescorted ships from Convoy SLS64.70
Dispersed as it was, the Royal Navy could not deal effectively with the multi-
faceted threat posed by Germany’s surface fleet, U-boats, and auxiliary cruisers. 
As Stephen Roskill notes, Britain lost significant merchant shipping during this 
period. The German surface ships, “for a time, completely dislocated our Atlantic 
convoy circles, with serious consequences to our vital imports. Their [Scharnhorst 
and Gneisenau’s] depredations forced the wide dispersal of our already strained 
naval resources, and successfully diverted attention from the returning Scheer and 
Hipper; while, by their subsequent arrival in a Biscay port, they became an immi-
nent threat to all our Atlantic shipping.”71 Despite the best efforts of Admiral John 
Tovey, commander in chief of the Home Fleet, all four warships reached port safely: 
Scheer and Hipper to Germany, and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau to Brest in France.
The pressure that these forays exerted was especially important because in 
February the number of active U-boats was at its lowest level of the entire war. 
Furthermore, the U-boats now were confronted with improved radar, escorts, 
and ASW tactics, forcing Dönitz to redeploy his units farther west and away 
from convoy congestion zones.72 Still, total tonnage sunk from January until 
March amounted to 1,253,339 tons. The U-boats sank the largest portion of these 
losses, accounting for 566,585 tons, but the surface fleet and auxiliary cruisers 
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contributed nearly a quarter of the overall total, with 301,885 tons. The surface 
raiders therefore made an invaluable contribution to Germany’s attempt to con-
summate a blockade of Britain, by dispersing British naval strength, disrupting 
military convoys, and sinking the shipping tonnage they did.
So far, the deployment of the surface fleet had aided the German war effort 
dramatically, despite its inferior size and strength relative to the Royal Navy. 
For the first time in history, German battleships were operating in the Atlan-
tic against British shipping with near impunity. Only when they reached port in 
France were the ships seemingly vulnerable, to heavy air raids.73 Additionally, 
the German surface fleet soon reached its zenith with the commissioning of the 
battleships Bismarck and Tirpitz and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. Anticipating 
further success, in April 1941 Raeder outlined plans for a new operation, code-
named RHINE EXERCISE. In a manner reminiscent of Germany’s prewar planning 
and Castex’s theories, the new warships, along with Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, 
now would be free to engage their dispersed enemy counterparts. This, it was 
expected, would change further the balance of naval power, creating favorable 
circumstances to achieve victory in the war at sea. Reflecting his faith in the op-
eration, Raeder even gave orders that U.S. naval forces could be engaged as well.74
However, Raeder’s original cohort of four capital ships and two cruisers was 
reduced quickly. The British Admiralty, realizing the threat that a concentration 
of German surface forces posed, attempted to keep the ships from going to sea 
by heavy Royal Air Force bombardment of Brest that damaged Gneisenau. Mean-
while, mechanical problems kept Scharnhorst in port, and Tirpitz could not be 
made ready in time for the operation. This left only Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. 
Nonetheless, determined to keep up the pressure on British shipping, the opera-
tion commenced on 18 May under the command of Admiral Lütjens. It famously 
would end with the destruction of Bismarck on 27 May 1941.75
Although the drama of Bismarck’s loss has overshadowed the strategic impor-
tance of the operation, to the Admiralty even a reduced sortie of German surface 
fleets was a major threat, especially in light of Operation BERLIN’s success against 
British shipping. The Admiralty therefore had mobilized a force of nineteen 
major warships drawn from the Home Fleet, Force H (stationed at Gibraltar), 
and convoy escorts to hunt Bismarck and Prinz Eugen.76 This traditionally has 
been seen as an exaggerated response to Bismarck’s victory over the battle cruiser 
Hood, pride of the Royal Navy.77 However, had Bismarck arrived safely in France 
it would have been united with Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen, and 
perhaps even Tirpitz—and Germany could have commenced RHINE EXERCISE 
once again.78 However, a chance torpedo hit on Bismarck’s rudder, delivered by 
an aircraft from Ark Royal, crippled the German ship, providing Admiral Tovey 
enough time to bring up his forces—before they ran out of fuel—to finish the 
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German battleship. The loss of Bismarck was a critical juncture in the war at sea, 
as it brought a sudden end to Raeder’s surface-fleet strategy.
Although Prinz Eugen, having been detached from Bismarck before the battle-
ship met its end, made it safely to France, never again did German surface ships 
challenge the Royal Navy offensively. German supply ships and auxiliary cruisers 
also became prime targets for the Royal Navy, with ten destroyed by the end of 
1941.79 Pressure from Britain and the United States also helped curtail resupply 
efforts in and from neutral ports.80 Shocked by the loss of Bismarck, Hitler ex-
erted increased personal control over the deployment of surface ships, refusing 
to allow further operations. Indeed, the loss of Bismarck marked the German 
surface fleet’s last Atlantic operation, and in February 1942 Hitler, over Raeder’s 
protests, ordered the remaining heavy warships to Norway to provide defense 
and to disrupt Arctic convoys to Russia.81
By 1942, therefore, the surface fleet largely ceased to be a major strategic threat 
to British operations in the Atlantic. By then, however, the U-boats had surpassed 
their prewar numbers and were achieving great success. Convoy attacks peaked 
in 1941, and in 1942 the highest proportion of shipping of the entire war was 
sunk. By 1943, though, the U-boat campaign also was on the wane, while Germa-
ny suffered major defeats across North Africa and in Russia.82 Raeder retired that 
year and Dönitz took over as head of the Kriegsmarine. Although the commerce-
raiding potential of Germany’s surface fleet never materialized fully during the 
war, this should not overshadow the very real threat it posed from 1939 to 1941.
After the war Dönitz claimed, “The sinking of the Bismarck was a grave loss for 
the navy. . . . On the other hand, the strong reaction of English naval forces proved 
that the strategic object had succeeded—that of keeping the English Fleet busy, 
added to the direct success attained by sinkings.”83
However, the German surface fleet was much more than a mere placeholder 
force while the U-boat arm was built up. Indeed, the war at sea between Britain 
and Germany was not purely a U-boat war, nor was the German surface fleet 
made up of antiquated ships destined to sink or expire over the course of the 
conflict. Even Churchill’s famous comment on the U-boat menace was in refer-
ence to the years 1940 and 1941—a time that, as this article has highlighted, was 
in fact the heyday of the German surface fleet’s attacks against British merchant 
shipping and when U-boat numbers were relatively low.84 In reality, the German 
surface fleet played a pivotal role in the war at sea from 1939 to 1942.
In the aftermath of the First World War, many German naval thinkers reflect-
ed. They appraised the respective roles of U-boats and the surface fleet, theoriz-
ing about what functions these units could perform in a future naval war. Guided 
by the experience of that war and influenced by the anticipated success of ASW 
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measures, they generally accepted that U-boats could not be relied on as the de-
cisive instrument of naval warfare. This was not, however, a case of traditionalist 
myopia. Cruiser warfare was of particular interest to Raeder, who believed that 
only a surface fleet, operating in conjunction with U-boats and, later, airpower, 
could disperse an enemy naval force sufficiently to accomplish the piecemeal 
weakening of its parent country, militarily and economically.
Technological development during the 1930s provided further clarity on the 
potential of the surface fleet. The Germans produced remarkable innovations 
such as the Panzerschiff, which seemingly vindicated their faith in the capital ship 
as the core of any modern fleet. This also was due in no small part to the still-
primitive state of U-boat development. Still, they concluded by the late 1930s 
that no single form of naval power, be it U-boat or capital ships, was sufficient 
on its own to be a decisive force. As a result, German planners opted to build a 
balanced fleet that integrated submarines, aircraft, and auxiliary combatants with 
the battleship as its nucleus, rather than the classic surface fleet. The German 
navy formulated an appropriate strategy for challenging the Royal Navy, but it 
lacked the capability to implement it in 1939. Still, despite his initial pessimism, 
Raeder committed his small force to offensive operations.
Far from being merely a transitional period leading to the ascent of the Ger-
man U-boats to being the foremost weapon for waging war on British commerce, 
the early years of World War II saw Germany’s surface fleet making a concerted 
effort to disrupt and destroy British commerce and naval power, which created a 
major strategic threat to the British. The seizure of Norway and France allowed 
the effective deployment of German naval forces against British sea trade. The 
surface fleet made crucial contributions to the war at sea by disrupting and dis-
persing the Royal Navy, not just supporting the still-sparse U-boat fleet. Indeed, 
the British Admiralty devoted extensive resources to preventing the concentra-
tion of German surface forces during the war, knowing how significantly a major 
German thrust would threaten critical transatlantic trade. This validation of Ger-
many’s hybrid strategy in conception, if not in execution, similarly validates the 
importance of surface fleets in the understanding of the European war at sea, and 
the conduct of commerce war in general.
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